



SAT

**A user-centred view of security
for the NT file system, Registry and Active
Directory**

(SAT Prototype + Future Work & Future Plans)

<http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/sat/>


(MSR Security Workshop 2000-11-27, Cambridge, UK)



A general view of permissions/rights

The Access Matrix

	<i>Object1</i>	<i>Object2</i>	<i>Object3</i>	<i>Object4</i>	<i>Object5</i>	<i>Object6</i>	<i>...</i>
<i>User1</i>	-	-	change	change	-	-	...
<i>User2</i>	-	-	-	-	read	-	...
<i>...</i>
<i>Group1</i>	change	change	-	-	change	-	...
<i>Group2</i>	read	read	exec	exec	-	read	...
<i>...</i>
	<i>Computer1</i>				<i>Computer2</i>		<i>...</i>



The problem [1]

Capability vectors versus access control lists

Capability vectors:

permissions/rights are stored as a row of the access matrix

example in W2000: right to access RAS, group membership, ...

- + Easy to answer: What are the dedicated user's rights?
- Difficult to answer: Who has rights on a dedicated object ????



The problem [2]


Capability vectors versus access control lists

Access control lists (ACLs):

permissions are stored as a column of the access matrix

examples in W2000: NTFS directories and files, Registry keys, objects in the Active Directory

- + Easy to answer: Which users/groups have dedicated object access?
- **Difficult to answer: What are all the objects a dedicated user has access to?**



The problem gets even worse...

**Inspection of multiple rows necessary
(because of group memberships)**

Large access matrix

Distribution of access information

Set of results in most cases very large

...

**Consequence: standard tools are often of
limited use only**



How operating systems manage inheritance

Create time inheritance


copies the ACL of the parent to its own ACL when the object is created

Run time inheritance

evaluates permissions of an object at runtime by traversing the tree from the object up until it finds appropriate permissions

Automatic propagation of permissions

whenever permissions of the parent are changed, permissions of underlying objects with enabled inheritance are adapted accordingly



Goal of the SAT project

Design and evaluate visualisation of hierarchically structured persistent objects

Deal with “ad hominum” permissions and effective permissions

Cover the different concepts of inheritance in a single approach

Prototype for Windows NT / Windows 2000

Special attention to NTFS, Registry, ADS, ...




Proposed solution

Generate a user-oriented view from the already given object-oriented view of security

Use compression algorithms to make the result short, concise and meaningful.

Make the compression level selectable according to requirements of different administration tasks

Offer a viewer with simple GUI and an interface to a report generator



Meaning of “compression”

Not the standard meaning!

The goal: we want to make the output (or the browser list) as compact and as precise as possible. Nevertheless it has to remain fully readable.

Compression in the sense of this presentation e.g. a simple directory listing


file1.htm, file2.htm, file3.htm, file4.html, file5.html


simple: 3 *.htm, 2 *.html or better: 5 <IE>

e.g. do not display subdirectories the user does not have access to




SAT prototype system architecture





SAT prototype simplified screendump




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
SAT prototype simplified screendump




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SAT prototype simplified screendump



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SAT prototype file name compression

0 all files are displayed including full filenames

```
v1000.doc [RWXD--]
v1001.doc [RWXD--]
actual.bmp [RWXD--]
old_03.bmp [R-X---
```

2 all files with same file extension and same permissions are grouped together

```
2 *.doc [RWXD--]
1 *.bmp [R-X---
```


3 all files with same permissions are grouped together

```
1 *.* [R-X---
```

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Expanding the prototype: new file name compression

All files with same associated application are combined

```
page1.html [R-X---]
page2.htm  [R-X---]
demo1.ppt  [RWXD--]
demo2.pps  [RWXD--]
pptapp.ppa [RWXD--]
```

Result:

```
2 <IE> [R-X---]
3 <PowerPoint> [RWXD--]
```



Expanding the prototype: compressing permissions [1]

NTFS 5 standard permissions


Full control, Modify, Read & Execute, Read, Write

comprise 13 advanced permissions:

Traverse folder / Execute file, Create files / Write data,
Create folders / Append data, Write attributes, Write
extended attributes, Delete subfolders and files,
Delete, Change permissions, Take Ownership, ...

A mapping example:

Read = List folder / Read data & Read attributes &
Read extended attributes & Read permissions



Expanding the prototype: compressing permissions [2]

<p>R = List folder / Read data & Read attributes & Read extended attributes & Read permissions</p>	<p>e.g. only Read and Write</p> <p>[RW] [rW] [-W] [Rw] [rw] [-w] [R-] [r-] [--]</p>
<p>r = List folder / Read data Read attributes Read extended attributes Read permissions</p>	



Expanding the prototype: Windows 2000 inheritance

standard inheritance


\dir\ [RW]
 \dir\file1 [RW] (file is not displayed in most cases)

inheritance + permission W / + deny all

\dir\ [Rw]
 \dir\file1 [RW] += [-W] = [Rw] + [-W]
 \dir\file2 [--] -= [RW] = [Rw] - [RW]

no (dynamic) inheritance

\dir\ [R-]
 \dir\file3 = [RW]



Expanding the prototype: display Registry inheritance

C = current key
S = subkeys

0 1 x

- C--** This key only (= do not inherit)
- CSS** This key and subkeys
- SS** Subkeys only
- CS-** This key and subkeys & propagate inheritable permissions one level only
- S-** Subkeys only & propagate inheritable permissions one level only




Expanding the prototype: display NTFS inheritance

C = current directory **F** = files
S = subdirectories **B** = both (F+S)

0 1 x

- C--** This folder only (= do not inherit)
- CBB** This folder, subfolders and files (default)
- CSS** This folder and subfolders
- CF~~F~~** This folder and files
- B~~F~~** Subfolders and files only
- SS** Subfolders only
- F~~F~~** Files only



Expanding the prototype: maximum permission colours

red:
equal and higher permissions in this directory

yellow:
equal and lower permission in this directory


green:
same security in this directory



Expanding the prototype: dealing with ADS complexity

- Large number of different classes
=> difficult to display inheritance
- Large set of permissions
- Extended rights

- + Same concepts as for NTFS and Registry
- + Concentrate on generic / standard permissions
- + Special treatment of objects with default permissions (simply omit them?)
- + Check if only “delegate control (for common tasks)” has been used to modify permissions



Expanding the prototype: compressing AD-permissions

R = Generic Read
= $B_x \& B_y \& B_z \& \dots$

r = part of Generic Read
= $B_x | B_y | B_z | \dots |$
has read permission on at least one
attribute of the object

Treat other generic permissions the same way
Combine “Extended Rights” into one
(user/group has extended rights on object)



Expanding the prototype: compressing AD-permissions

We do not want to specify the precise per-
missions (because there are too much of them,
especially if we include R/W on every attribute
and all extended rights)

Show precise permissions with tooltips


Plan to list samples and their security

number of objects with same security

object class

name of one of these objects

already compressed security



Project status

Prototype (NTFS NT4) available at
<http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/sat>

**permissions for a user/group and
effective permissions for a user/group, including
all group memberships Top-down:
analysis of frequent cases of ACL inheritance in
NTFS, ADS and Registry
design new “compression” algorithms**




Further plans

Future work:

**development of basic modules for the new
application: access to ADS, practice with MMC,
access to SQL-server, ...
design of new “compression” algorithms**

Long-term future (e.g.):

**inclusion of computers and shares in the analysis
compare permissions of different users/groups
show permissions of all members of a group or OU (in the
form of union and intersection)
support automatic comparison of successive scans and
mark security-relevant differences**



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