Mag. iur. Dr. techn. Michael Sonntag

Online searches

Computer forensics

Institute for Information Processing and
Microprocessor Technology (FIM)
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

E-Mail: sonntag@fim.uni-linz.ac.at
http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/staff/sonntag.htm

Agenda

- What is an "online search"?
  - → Current investigative possibilities and their shortcomings
- Current legal state: Austria, Germany
  - → The recent decision of the German BVerfG
- Potential legal problems:
  - → Basic rights
  - → Copyright, el. signatures, …
- Technical implementation
  - → Hardware
  - → Software: Remote Forensic Software (RFS)
- Dangers and limitations

What is an "online search"?

- Online search: Investigating **the** computer of a suspect "over the Internet"
- Typical elements:
  - → Without knowledge of the suspect (secret)
  - → Inspecting data residing on the computer, not only that which is sent from or to it
  - → Used to overcome cryptography and custom protocols
    - » Get at the data before/after it has been en-/decrypted
- Optional elements:
  - → Without going there physically, i.e. remote installation
    - » Through hacking, infected E-Mails/websites/updates, …
  - → Realtime monitoring: Data is sent back to the police over the Internet continuously (during other online traffic)
  - → Continuous monitoring ⇔ One-time remote imaging
  - → By software (Remote Forensic Software, RFS)

Current investigative possibilities and their shortcomings

- Computer forensics: Impound computer and investigate
- Bugging: Copying data during transmission
  - → Telephones, internet connections etc.
- Main problems are
  - → Encryption: Data is sent and stored encrypted only
    - » Examples: PGP + E-Mail, Harddisk encryption, Skype
  - → No transmission: Plans for attacks are only stored locally but never transmitted, physical search difficult
    - » Duplicating a large disk requires a long time!
  - → Secrecy: Acquiring data without the suspect knowing it
    - » Secret physical searches are difficult and "dangerous"
  - → Precautions by suspects
    - » Usually larger groups → Not everyone has a secure system

Legal state: Austria

- Ministry of the interior absolutely wants it
- 3/2008: Report by a working party of several ministries
  - → Currently there is no legal basis whatsoever
  - → Hidden searches as well as remote infiltration would constitute a criminal act at the moment
    - » Especially: Programming the software & deploying/using it
    - » Possible now: Listening in on communication, bugging
  - → It is not completely impossible by the constitution
    - » But it would be quite difficult to do, require a lot of precautions, and could be used only rarely
  - → Technical problems are not completely clear, especially regarding the value (reliability) of evidence obtained
- Legally situation is seen as comparable to Germany
  - → See the recent BVerfG decision later!

Legal state: Germany

- Currently hidden online searches are illegal in Germany
  - » Decision by the BGH, GZ StB 18/06 from 31.1.2007
  - → Differs from bugging and telecommunication surveillance
  - → It is prohibited to combine elements from various laws allowing basic rights infraction to create a new one
- A law of Nordrhein-Westfalen allowing hidden online search **was** found unconstitutional
  - » Decision by the BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 from 27.2.2008
  - → Note: The decision does not disallow hidden online searches completely!
    - » Its just very difficult to match all the prerequisites
    - » The law to inspect did not match all of them
- **It can be expected, that a law allowing it will be passed**

German BVerfG decision

- Requirements defined by the court:
  - → General basic constitutional right on the confidentiality and integrity of information systems
  - → Actual evidence for a concrete danger for an outstandingly important legally protected right
    - » E.g.: Physical integrity, life, freedom of persons; common goods whose endangerment affects the foundations of the state or the existence of humans
    - » Could be possible if not yet sufficiently probable that the danger will materialize soon, but specific facts hint at a danger by specific person(s) in a concrete instance
  - → Previous permission by a judge
  - → Must protect the inner core of private life
- Value as evidence might be doubtful, but it need not be criminal proceedings → Usable for "investigation"

German BKA law

- Includes various other provisions
  - → Audio/Video surveillance in private homes
  - → Telecommunication surveillance
- Requirements for RFS:
  - → Certain facts support he conclusion, that there are
    - » Even if there is no real proof that without this measure such a threat will materialize in the near future
      - – Requires three elements: Single case, temporal closeness of conversion of threat to damage and specific person as cause
  - → threats for the physical integrity, life, or freedom of persons
  - → threats for common goods whose endangerment
    - » affects the foundations or the existence of the state
    - » affects the foundations of the existence of humans
  - → It must be necessary and other possibilities cannot be expec-ted to be sufficient or would be significantly more difficult

German BKA law

- Duration: Maximum of three months
  - → 3 months extension (repeatedly, as long as necessary)
- Protection of the tools used / data collected
  - → Only according to state of technology, not of science
- Does not necessarily require consent by a judge
  - → If "urgent", the president of the BKA can allow it
    - » Permission must be confirmed by a judge within three days
- Excluded from surveillance are
  - → Representatives, clergy, advocate of the investigated person
  - → Not included: Doctors, journalists, lawyers
- Changes must be reverted after the end (autom. or man.)
- Deciding on exclusion of specially protected material
  - → Done by BKA itself: Privacy officer + 2 others (one must fulfil the requirements for appointment as a judge)
    - » Note: Only the privacy officer is independent (no orders) …

German BKA law

- Extensive logging:
  - → Description of the software
    - » Only very generally; no technical details!
    - » BKA should store a copy of the software for possible later investigation by an independent expert
  - → Identification of the system under surveillance
  - → All changes made
    - » Unless purely RAM-based; This can be very difficult!
      - – Must happen on the computer or be transmitted to the BKA
  - → Metadata on the collected data
    - » Filename, version number, modification date, file size
  - → Organisational unit performing the surveillance
- Log data may only be used for deciding on the lawfulness of the surveillance
  - → Must be deleted after end of one calendar year after storage
    - » I.e., not after the end of surveillance, notice of suspect of it, …!

Potential legal problems: Basic rights

- Three main aspects are touched:
  - → Privacy: The collection of the data as such
  - → Freedom of communication: Inspecting E-Mail/VoIP(…
  - → Inviolability of home: Physically installing the RFS
- Basic rights are not absolute: Appropriateness limitation
  - » Necessary, but not sufficient argumentation!
  - → Public interest: Scope limited by the ECHR!
    - » Seen as problematical by the German decision (see later!)
  - → Suitability: Technical solution must be reliable and useful
  - → Appropriateness: Less intrusive ways possible?
    - » Reduced by control, oversight, etc.
- General problem: Should be available in very early stages, but need for a very strong suspicion!
  - → "We don’t know much, but we fear the worst!"

Fair trial: Self-incrimination

- Self-incrimination: Helping yourself in decrypting material, which might be damaging for you
  - → Usually excluded: What can be obtained through compulsory powers, e.g. bodily tissue (→ DNA testing), blood samples, physical keys, etc. but exists independent of the will of the accused (motives, knowledge, ….)
    - » Independently existing: Can be very reliable
    - » Depends on the will of the suspect: Unreliable (lies!)
      - – Here: Because "hidden" → Quite reliable (but not completely; the suspect might have caught on to the RFS!)
  - → One approach: You are not required to disclose keys, but if police finds them independently, they are admissible
    - » Murder weapon: Admissible; telling where it is: Disallowed
  - → Note: In UK exists a law requiring disclosure of keys
    - » First persons imprisoned (<= 5 years possible) for refusing!
- "Bending the will": Does not happen here

Potential legal problems: Electronic signature

- One key aspect of online searches is cryptography
  - → This can be a conflict with electronic signatures!
- According to the law, the important legal consequences of a qualified electronic signature will not apply, if the security measures have been compromised
  - → If someone has access to the computer used for signing, he modify the data sent to the external device used for signing, i.e. modify the content
    - » PIN/private key typically do not leave the smartcard reader, so they cannot be accessed by RFS
  - → These signatures are then invalid!
    - » This could mean, that a crime has not been completed, but only attempted
    - » This could lead to problems for innocent persons, where third parties could claim this

Potential legal problems: Copyright

- Copyright: RFS changes other SW to remain undetected
  - → Is this allowed?
  - → Currently completely unknown!
    - » There exists an exception for criminal proceedings and public security
    - » But: Exception must be seen narrowly
    - » But: Little incentive for protests from copyright owners
- Copyright for the RFS itself
  - → Must probably be adhered to even then
    - » Modification of a program allowed, but the trojan must be programmed by the police, not copied from somewhere
  - → Otherwise secret services would not have to pay for any software they use, as it is employed for public security!

Potential legal problems: Damages

- Through modifying the security elements of a computer and the modifications themselves, damages can occur
  - → "Normal" search: The suspect can tell the police what might be dangerous. If he doesn't do this, surprising damages will not be compensated.
- Examples:
  - → Other malware might reach the computer
  - → The RFS might have a bug and damage something
  - → When adding hardware, something gets broken
  - → Additional costs because of the RFS communication
- Austria: Plans for a compensation obligation independent of guilt → Only causality required

Potential legal problems: Various

- International jurisdiction: Searching computers in other countries (Laptops!) would be problematic
  - → Especially with electronic "infection": Location very difficult to ascertain!
  - → Searching not suspect but someone else who is communicating with him, because this person is "available"?
- Specially protected persons: It is not the area of a specific person, that is searched, but a machine
  - → Which can be used by anyone, including special persons
  - → Examples: Priests, medical doctors, attorneys, …
    - » Searching their documents would be extremely difficult, if not completely illegal, in the "physical" world
    - » How to distinguish their data from that of someone else on a shared computer?
    - » How to know whether the suspect is such a person?

Technical implementation Hardware

- Adding a hardware keylogger to the system
  - → Requires physical access to the computer
  - → Depending on the location (in cord/within the keyboard) they are easy/extremely hard to detect
  - → Drawbacks:
    - » Radio → Easy to find
    - » Storage → Requires physical presence for data extraction; no realtime monitoring possible
    - » Difficult to evaluate the data
    - » No access to stored data, only to newly added one
    - » Detection and possession usually do not allow reuse or reengineering for other purposes
  - → Advantages: Reliable, proven technology, hard to detect, little potential for misuse by others
- Theoretical option: Hardware screenshot taking

Technical implementation Hardware

- Recording electromagnetic emissions
  - → Possible through the air (especially tube monitors), but also over the wires (data and power cables)
    - » Also possible indirectly: Heating pipes, air condition, …
  - → Depending on equipment, building, and technology (esp. antennas) used distances up to 500 m are possible
    - » E.g. serial data cables: 40-50 meters over the air
  - → Difficult to distinguish between multiple data sources
  - → No searching possible, only "viewing" what the suspect currently views/enters
  - → No possibility of detection by the suspect
  - → Impossible to prevent for non-experts, with normal materials, or for normal equipment
  - → Depends largely on external influences (building, noise,...)
  - → Misuse extremely hard (equipment expensive, use complex)

Technical implementation Software (RFS)

- Installing a software for inspections
  - → Also called: "State trojan", "Remote Forensic Software"
- Allows inspection of the whole computer, i.e. remote control to execute arbitrary commands
  - → Can take screenshots, log keystrokes, copy files, search disks for regular expressions, copy E-Mail, …
  - → Has access to every single bit of data on the system
  - → Access to all those external systems reached/logged in to with the same rights as the user
    - » Note: External logging can be a problem then!
- Possible completely over Internet → Unknown location
- (Partially) deactivating security measures:
  - → Antivirus, personal firewall, rootkit detection, …

How to "infect" a system

- Physical visit (twice!)
  1. Gather necessary data for building a custom RFS
  2. Install RFS on the system
- Using a hack to smuggle it in
  - → Known software bug (buying exploits?)
  - → Update/software download (company/ISP cooperation?)
    - » ISP can modify webpages, downloads, … on the fly
  - → E-Mail attachment to be clicked on by suspect (reliable?)
- Other persons using the same computer (motivation?)
- Company/ISP personnel (legal obligation?)
  - → Add it on the fly to any unsecured software download
- "If the police could infect my system, others might have done this too → It wasn't me!"

Dangers of RFS

- Detection of the RFS
  - → "Feeding" the police with incorrect data (suspect, thirds)
  - → Using the software for criminal activities
- Trustworthiness
  - → Installation is a (usually extensive!) modification of the system to search
  - → How is the person performing the search monitored?
- Detection by Antivirus/IDS
  - → Not that large because of special (?) production
- Destruction of data/evidence by installation and use
  - → File system area overwritten, system integrity, speed, …
- How to counter virtual machines?
  - → Rebuilding it from a write-protected area every time?

Limitations of RFS

- Difficult to ensure targeting the correct system when installed remotely
  - → E.g. E-Mail → Internet café comp. somewhere is infected
- Removing it afterwards
  - → For innocents as well as criminals
  - → How to remove it from backups (→later analysis/reuse!)?
  - → How to ensure everything is left as it was?
- Must be built separately for each system:
  - → Windows vs. Linux vs. Solaris, …
  - → Various antivirus and firewall vendors
  - → Computer configuration
- Hiding the transmission of data
  - → Only when other data is sent, compression (amount!)
  - → None: Physical visit and no interactive gathering

Problems: Evidentiary value

- How reliable is data from a compromised system?
  - → If the police could "hack" it, others could have done the same (and then put in illegal material, changed data, …)!
- Official search: The suspect is present and can log objections, other persons are present as well
  - → How to ensure that the police (or even a single policeman) cannot make changes?
    - » Can RFS be built that such changes are absolutely impossible?
- How to ensure unmodified and secure transmission?
  - → Encryption + signing/checksums on suspect's computer
- Planned measures:
  - → Logging (de-)installation, transmission, changes
    - » Where? How done securely? Data overwritten?
    - » To avoid arguments: "The RFS deleted/added this file"

Conclusions

- Some kind of hidden online search will be introduced
  - → Securely encrypted communication must be broken somehow in some cases
- What needs to be addressed in addition:
  - → Accidental finds
  - → Informing communication partners and third persons
  - → International aspects (partners in other countries)
    - » E.g. where listening in on a communication is illegal …
  - → Who investigates the content and excludes material which is either irrelevant or is prohibited to be used
- Technical solution quite open: Hardware/Software?
  - → RFS is a dangerous terrain, as the software will "escape" ….



Questions?

Thank you for your attention!